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Abstract :  
In this paper a model for the formation of strategic alliances is studied. Innovation 
results from the recombination of knowledge held by the partners to the collaboration, 
and from the history of their collaboration. Innovation brings partners closer together, 
while at the same time the repetition of partnerships fosters trust and helps improving 
the outcome of each round of cooperation. A tension exists between innovating with 
people I know in order to reduce uncertainty at the expense of the net benefit from our 
joint effort, and innovating with strangers with whom the outcome of joint innovation 
can be greater but at a larger risk of failure. This “organized proximity”, built through 
the experience of cooperation, can be at the origin of strongly structured networks of 
innovation, where agents’ relations focus on limited cliques of partners. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since as early as Schumpeter, economists have acknowledged that innovation consists 
largely of the recombination of existing knowledge. Recently, however, changes in the 
knowledge environment of firms has made this recombination more difficult for 
individual firms. The general idea is that in most industries today the technologies both 
being used and being produced involve  technological expertise that covers a much 
broader range of ‘disciplines’ than has hitherto been the case (see Weitzman, 1998; 
Olsson, 2000; Smith, 2000), What this implies is that types of knowledge necessary to 
innovate and compete successfully can lie outside a firm's main area of expertise. A 
now common way of coping with this problem is to form an alliance with a firm that 
has the missing  expertise. Inter-firm cooperation can be extremely effective in 
increasing the circulation of tacit knowledge, and in creating possibilities for a firm to   2 
acquire knowledge outside its  boundaries, and these co-operative agreements for R&D 
have grown dramatically in number since 1976.
1 
 
Nevertheless, cooperation is risky, in the sense that it is marked by uncertainty relative 
both to the actual skills of the partner and to his reliability. Moreover, cooperation 
implies  mutual knowledge and sharing of routines, representations, ways of thinking 
and so on. In other words, it demands a proximity of actors that has to be built through 
the experience of cooperation. Coriat and Guennif (1998) argue that, in a partnership, 
trust evolves as a result of a “meaningful” repetition of interactions between the 
partners. They consider interaction  “provides additional information and meaning about 
the partners’ behaviour”, reducing uncertainty and establishing “a minimum of 
predictability in the behaviour of the partners”. In that sense, trust construction and 
learning are strongly related (Sako, 1991; Dodgson, 1996). 
 
Cooperation also needs the existence of an intermediary common ground between 
partners, starting point of a common action. Gallison (1999) shows that in experimental  
physics, cooperation between theorists, experimenters and instrumenters is made 
possible by the emergence of some sort of “creole”, an intermediary level knowledge 
specific to a given pair of actors, that has been built through their repeated interactions. 
 
But when  cooperating, partners will tend to bring their knowledge profiles closer 
together, reducing then their mutual attractivity. Nooteboom (2004) assumes the 
proposition “that ongoing interaction will yield a reduction of cognitive distance, or, in 
other words, identification. This increases mutual understanding, but also reduces the 
scope for learning. This yields the hypothesis that performance of learning is an inverse-
U shaped function of the duration of interaction”. 
 
To model strategic technological alliances in their entirety is far beyond the scope of 
this paper. We are interested in the nature of the networks of innovators that emerge 
from a process in which firms engage in  bilateral cooperation to produce knowledge. 
Technological alliances can be very rich and varied, but for our purposes we focus on a 
single effect, namely the production of shared knowledge. It is affected by the 
complementarities between the participants’ knowledge endowments (how different we 
are, and differences are a good thing in our model) and the risk of failure which is 
intrinsic to R&D collaborations, and decreases with the frequency of past interactions 
for any pair of collaborating firms. 
 
2. The model 
The dynamics of the model are simple: firms form alliances based on their expectations 
of the amount of output attributable to any collaboration. Innovation takes place as a 
result of the joint effort of pairs of agents, and the repetition of this fuels a process of 
                                                 
1 See Hagedoorn (2001) for a review and discussion of  this trend.   3 
network formation and evolution. Alliances here are bilateral. The market for alliances 
is assumed to be at equilibrium within each round, implying each firm is assigned a 
single partner, and the concept used is that of stability of the matching. When 
collaborative R&D is performed by two firms their knowledge endowments are 
combined to produce new knowledge. New knowledge thus created is added to the 
existing individual endowments. The knowledge production function determines how 
much new knowledge is generated as a function of the variety of the partners’ 
contributions, i.e. how different they are. Comparison of new knowledge production is 
extended to self-matching, that is, to the case in which agents prefer to innovate by 
staying alone rather by cooperating with a partner. Regarding pair formation, agents 
rank each other on the basis of their expected potential output. As a result rankings 
change over time because innovation changes individual knowledge profiles. A stable 
matching always exists (this is shown below) so each period this stable assignment 
determines which pairs of agents combine their knowledge.  
 
We have assumed here that agents are pursuing knowledge for its own sake. This is 
unrealistic in general for firms, who pursue knowledge more generally for the sake of 
profits. To incorporate that explicitly in the model adds significant complication, 
demanding a fully blown goods market with production and consumption. We avoid 
that by this simplifying assumption, which, in an industry involved in rapid technical 
change, will be behaviourally quite adequate. A number of issues are of interest in this 
model, falling within two broad categories: the process of network formation and 
evolution; and the properties of knowledge growth. Before examining them, we discuss 
both matching and knowledge production in detail. 
 
Consider a set S={1,…,n} of individuals engaged in repeated interactions. Each 
individual i∈S is characterized by a real-valued knowledge endowment in the form of a 
vector. This allows a very simple representation of individuals as points in a knowledge 
space. The sort of partnerships we have in mind are collaborative agreements such as 
joint ventures or joint R&D contracts. Hence there is a market for alliances, and the 
equilibrium behaviour of this market will be studied. An equilibrium on this market will 
be defined as a situation in which the alliances are all such that there are no two 
individuals who would rather form a partnership together than with their partner at 
equilibrium. That is, there are no blocking pairs.  
 
Once knowledge has been created and absorbed, which implies in particular that agents’ 
profiles are modified, a new round of matching begins, yielding a possibly different 
equilibrium in the market for alliances, based on agents’ new knowledge characteristics. 
It is worth mentioning the resemblance of this market for alliances and the market for 
marriages in Becker (1962). There as well pairs form in order to jointly produce utility 
via a household production function which transforms market goods and services into 
commodities that are not supplied by the market and from the consumption of which the 
couple derives utility (love, child care, etc.). In Becker, however, the issue of sharing 
the benefits from pairing arises naturally, whereas here non rivalry makes it simpler to 
find a solution to the problem of constructing a stable assignment.    4 
 
Innovation as we see it here is a process that combines the knowledge of two partners 
and produces new knowledge. In this process, diversity of knowledge inputs is central. 
Individual knowledge endowment are pooled within each knowledge category and then 
enter a knowledge production function. The extent to which diversity matters is a 
central parameter of the model. Also essential is how individual knowledge vectors are 
pooled into “the knowledge held by the pair”. On top of this comes uncertainty in the 
form of the realization of a Bernoulli random variable. Innovation is an all-or-nothing 
process in which either we get something out of the cooperation, or we do not. The 
probability of successful cooperation is increasing with the success of our past 
encounters. We study how this learning effect counterbalances the exhaustion of 
innovative possibilities, and whether this is desirable from the point of view of 
knowledge creation. 
2.1 The roommates matching problem 
Because we consider a single population of firms rather than two populations (of jobs 
and workers for instance) matching here is a roommate, rather than a standard marriage 
problem. A one-sided, roommate, matching problem is defined as follows (see Gale and 
Shapley, 1962). Each individual i∈S has a strict preference ordering ∠i over all the 
individuals in S–{i} (a list of his most preferred first). All preferences are complete and 
transitive, and ∠ denotes the profile of the preference orderings of the individuals. 
 
Definition 1: The pair (S, ∠) is called a roommates matching problem.  
 
A matching is a partition of S into n/2 disjoint pairs of roommates, that is to say a 
bijection µ:S→S such that µ(µ(i))=i for all i ∈ S . 
 
Definition 2: A matching µ is stable in (S, ∠) if there is no (i, j) ∈ S
2 such that both 
µ(i) ∠i j and µ(j) ∠j i. 
 
When the condition of definition 2 fails, i and j form a blocking pair: they would both 
leave their partners to match with each other, and therefore µ cannot be an equilibrium. 
 
In the particular problem examined here, the preference profile ∠ is generated by a 
symmetric function f: S
2→R+, which associates to any pair of (distinct) individuals (i,j) 
a value that represents the innovative output of this pair. The profile of preference 
orderings ∠ is then defined by the following rule. 
 
Definition 3: For any  i ∈ S, j∠i  k if and only if r(i, k)>r(i, j) for all (j, k) in S
2 with   
j ≠ k. 
 
Disregarding cases of indifference (when there are i, j and k such that r(i,j)=r(i,k)), it 
will be shown that a unique stable matching always exists.   5 
2.2 Knowledge production: the innovation function 
There are many ways to characterize knowledge, none of them without its pitfalls. The 
knowledge of an agent comprises many different types of knowledge. It is expressed as 
vector of real numbers  ) (i vk . A representation of the innovation process should satisfy 
several minimal requirements. Consider two individuals i and j who conduct innovation 
jointly. After innovation has taken place, one would expect the following to be true: 
1.  the knowledge amounts held by i and j have increased; 
2.  the knowledge types of i and j have changed; 
3.  the distance between the knowledge types of i and j has fallen. 
 
Operationally, each pair of agents creates an amount of new knowledge determined by a 
production function, and this amount is simply added to the partner’s existing 
knowledge endowments. The knowledge type of individual i is modified by joint 
innovation conducted with µ(i), and changes in the direction of the endowment of µ(i). 
This is done by simply adding the amount of knowledge jointly produced partly to a 
joint profile of both inventors, and partly to each participant’s profile of expertise. 
 
Formally the innovation function is  
, ) , ( ) , (  with  :
/ 2
b
b a
k
k j i v j i f R S f 
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
= → ∑ +  
with  a the factor capturing decreasing returns to scale, and b  the elasticity of 
substitution between the different knowledge types. The case of b  close to minus 
infinity corresponds to perfect factor complementarity (Leontieff production function) 
and  1 = b  holds for perfect substitutability. Finally  0 ≈ b  corresponds to a symmetric 
Cobb-Douglas function. 
 
The first stage is pooling of knowledge according to  
)). ( ), ( max( )) ( ), ( min( ) 1 ( ) , ( j v i v j v i v j i v k k k k k θ θ + − =  
 
Such a pooling remains virtual, as each of the partners remains the owner of his own 
skills. Nevertheless, it permits a useful formalization  : after having aggregated the 
individual endowments, the joint profile becomes the input of a knowledge production 
function.  
 
The joint knowledge is described as a vector of amounts, lying between the minimum 
and the maximum of individual knowledge in each category. This can be interpreted as 
representing the extent to which the innovation process can be broken down into 
separable tasks : can agents do tasks separately, creating the joint output simply by 
amalgamating completed sub-tasks, or do both partners need to participate in each task. 
In the former case pooled knowledge could be the maximum in each category; in the 
latter, pooled knowledge will be the minimum.  
   6 
In this equation, θ can be seen as measuring the nature of the knowledge pooling which 
the knowledge creation task demands. For large values the task does not demand inputs 
from both partners, so within each knowledge type the maximum value of the two 
partners is the input. What this implies is that stable matchings will tend to match agents 
whose expertise lies in different area: pairs will be able to take advantage of each others' 
expertise, and the pooled vector will be largest. By contrast, when the pooling is on the 
minimum vector, stable matchings will match agents whose expertise profiles are 
similar. On this interpretation θ can be considered a measure of the taste for dissimilar 
partners.  
 
The amount  ) , ( j i f  however is only added to the two partners’ endowments if the 
venture is successful, which happens with probability 
t
ij µ =
t
ji µ . The term 
t
ij µ  is the 
probability that, i and j interact successfully  conditionally to  the recollection of (i,j) 
collaborations, as captured by the sum of discounted payoffs.  
 
Define the cumulated payoff to i from having interacted with  j  to be 
, ) , ( ~
0 ∑
=
− =
t
t
ij j i r g
τ
τ ρ  
where  ) , ( ~ j i r  is the actual amount of knowledge produced by the pair (i,j) at time τ . 
Based on this cumulated payoff, i and j builds their belief of  collaboration reliability as 
an a priori probability 
t
ij µ  that the cooperation will succeed, with  0
0 µ µ = ij  ∀j, and 
) ( ij
t
ij g µ µ = where 
. ) 1 ( 1 ) ( 0
x e x
− − − = µ µ  
 
With this specification µ(x)   1 when x  + ∞. Then the expected amount of 
knowledge potentially produced by a cooperation between i and j can be expressed as 
   ) , ( )] , ( [ j i f j i f E t
ij µ =  
It is the product of the amount of knowledge produced in case of success by the 
probability that the cooperation succeeds. As a result the score function is symmetrical 
and there always exists a unique stable matching. At the issue of the matching, a 
knowledge amount ξ ) , ( j i f  is produced and allocated to the agents, where ξ is a 
Bernoulli random variable {0,1} of expectation 
t
ij µ   The general intuition is that as an 
agent uses knowledge or is exposed to it, he will assimilate at least part of it, and 
thereby change the precise area of his expertise. 
 
3. The market for alliances: existence and uniqueness 
Before turning to the emergence of network structure and the associated knowledge 
dynamics, we discuss further in detail the market clearing mechanism present in this 
model. Because agents in any pair assign the same cardinal value to their match, a   7 
unique stable matching always exists, i.e. the market for equilibrium always possesses a 
unique equilibrium. We can prove this by construction, as shown in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: 
A roommates matching problem (S, ∠) for which the preference ordering of any 
i∈S is derived from f:S²→R+, with f(i,j)=f(j,i), admits a unique stable matching. 
 
Proof  : The algorithm to construct the stable matching is as follows. Let S0=S and 
µ0={∅}. There exists (a1,b1)∈S² such that f(a1,b1)=max(i,j)∈S² f(i,j). Furthermore as f is an 
injection, (a1,b1) is unique. Then (a1,b1) must belong to any stable assignment, as b1 is 
preferred to any other partner by a1 and reciprocally. No matching which does not 
involve this pair could be stable. Let then µ1=µ0+(a1,b1) and S1=S0–{a1,b1}. Again there 
is a single pair within S1² maximizing the innovation function. More generally define 
the recursive sequence µp=µp-1+(ap,bp) and Sp=Sp-1–{ap,bp} where (ap,bp) is the unique 
solution to max(i,j)∈S²p-1 f(i,j). There exists p ≥ n/2  such that the unique stable matching 
µp is the roommates matching solution. q = 2p – n is the number of agents that have 
preferred self-matching to cooperation. 
 
Ties do not occur as we work with real numbers. However in case of a tie (that is to say 
when individual i can achieve the same innovative output with two or more different 
partners), we resort to an arbitrary rule to guarantee that the score function is still a strict 
one: we choose the pair involving the individual with the smallest index, and if it is not 
enough the second smallest index individual. 
4. Numerical experiment 
We study a population of n  = 100 firms. At the outset individual knowledge 
endowments are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over [0,1]. Each period, 
the market for collaborative agreements is activated and firms form pairs in order to 
innovate or stay alone and innovate on themselves. The pairing results in a stable 
matching where stability is defined as above (everybody is as satisfied as possible, 
given everyone else’s preferences), and where the value of a pair to a firm is equal to 
the amount of knowledge produced by that pair. After innovation, the new knowledge is 
added to the firms’ knowledge stocks; the firms’ knowledge types change, as described 
previously; and so does accumulated experience. At the end of the period all pairs 
disband, and the process begins again in the following period. We iterate this process 
for 1000 periods, recording data for the whole history of the industry. 
 
In any period the static network consists of q isolated agents and (n-q)/2 disconnected 
pairs. To study the properties of the dynamic network, the list of connections active 
over time is recorded. This generates a weighted graph, in which the weight of an edge 
indicates how frequently the two firms have interacted in the history.  
Let  G(S,Vt) be the graph associated with the stable matching achieved at time 
t=0,1,2,…, that is Vt(i,j)=1 if (i,j)∈Gt and Vt(i,j)=0 otherwise. The weighted graph   8 
recording past interactions is denoted G(S,W) , where W(i,j)=W(j,i) is the frequency of 
activation of the connection between i and j over the history of the industry. For this 
graph several quantities are of interest. We would like to study the frequency 
distribution of collaborations and, following Watts and Strogatz (1998), two structural 
parameters: the average path length and the average cliquishness.
2 However, operating 
directly on W leads to interpretation problems: weighted graph analogues to 
cliquishness and path length exist but do not have well-defined bounds, hence are 
difficult to use and difficult to compare from one graph structure to the next when 
density varies. To circumvent this problem we translate the weighted graph into an un-
weighted graph by defining distances between two nodes in the following way. 
 
There are potentially many paths between i and j. Suppose there are Q paths, p1…pq…pQ 
between i and j, where pq=(i1,i2,i3…il), where il=j. With each path are associated two 
statistics: path length, li,j(pq), which is simply the number of nodes between i and j; and 
frequency:  Fi,j(pq) which can be interpreted as how commonly a path is activated 
between i and j. It is defined as:   
F i, j(pq) = W(im−1,im)
m=1
l ∏  
 
If pq is the path with the maximum frequency, then we define the distance between i and 
j, d(i,j), as li,j(pq).
3 
 
The average path length is 
,
1
) , ( 1∑
≠ −
=
i j n
j i d
n
L  
and simply measures how distant vertices are on average, which is a global property of 
the graph.  
 
Average cliquishness C is a measure of local connectivity capturing the share of active 
links between any given vertex’s neighbours. It is written 
,
2 / ) 1 (
) , ( 1
1 ) , ( ) , ( : , ∑
= = −
=
l i d j i d l j i i n n
l j X
n
C  
where X(j,l)=1 if d(i,j)=1 and 0 otherwise, and where ni=#{j|d(i,j)=1} is the size of i’s 
neighbourhood.  
 
                                                 
2 If one thinks of social networks representing friendship, both have intuitive interpretations. The 
path length is the number of friendships in the shortest chain connecting two agents. Cliquishness reflects 
the extent to which the friends of one agent are also friends of each other.  
3 There are other means of translating from a weighted graph to a non-weighted graph, which 
tend to involve declaring a threshold such that edges with weights above the threshold are assigned a 
weight of 1, whereas edges with frequencies below the threshold are assigned weights of 0. When 
reasonable algorithms are used for deciding the threshold, (such as assuming that a frequency vector is a 
multinomial distribution and setting the threshold at 2 standard deviations from the mean) the results are 
qualitatively similar to those generated by the algorithm we describe here.   9 
These two statistics together give a reasonably complete description of the structural 
properties of the underlying network. We add one simple measure, namely the average 
degree of the graph  
D=
1
n
ni
i ∑  
as a measure of the density of the interaction structure. 
 
5. Results 
We are interested in the effects of the nature of knowledge pooling on network structure 
and on the growth of knowledge. The network, on the other hand, is the result of firms’ 
willingness to combine knowledge of different sorts and evolves as firms’ needs and 
preferences over the population of potential partners changes over time. 
5.1 Knowledge 
In this section we examine the changes in knowledge levels when θ varies, with and 
without cumulative learning in the partnerships. We also comment on the similarity of 
partners in the equilibrium assignments. 
 
Knowledge levels (upper part of the graph, the case with cumulative learning is the left 
panel, while there is no learning in the right hand side one) reach comparable values 
with and without cumulative learning, with a clear take off when autarky is abandoned 
for partnerships. From then on the effect of θ is monotonic, more partners being 
unambiguously related to more knowledge. 
 
Regarding similarity, it is visible that learning delays the convergence of knowledge 
endowments, and thus tends to sustain a more persistent diversity. 
 
   10 
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5.2 Network 
In this section the properties of the emergent network are discussed. The average 
number of partnerships is represented, together with the proportion of transitive triples 
(a transitive triple is a partnership between two of my partners) and the average distance 
between partners. 
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The two upper panels in Figure 1 display the behaviour of the degree of the emergent 
network as a function of the pooling parameter θ for 4 distinct values of λ, the share of 
knowledge allocated to a common category. The upper left panel is concerned with the 
case of learning, with  0 µ  equal to 0.7, whereas in the upper right panel there is no 
memory of past interactions ( 0 µ  is equal to 0). Thus on the left side one would expect 
to see a trade-off between exploiting diversity and learning to cooperate, which is 
naturally absent from the right picture. 
In all cases the number of distinct partnerships in which a firm engages over its lifetime 
is an increasing function of the degree of task decomposition in the process of 
knowledge pooling. There is a critical value of θ below which autarky is the only mode 
of functioning, and this threshold value is independent from the allocation of new 
knowledge (the curves seem to take off slightly earlier, but this is due to the smoothing 
technique employed). The critical threshold is affected by the existence of cumulative 
learning to a very small extent (it shifts left when learning vanishes). 
Regarding more precisely how the degree responds to changes in λ, it is visible in both 
configurations of learning that there is a sharp transition between the case λ=0 where 
the degree rises abruptly at the threshold value and flattens out after, regardless of the 
value of θ, and all the values λ>0 for which the increase is persistent with θ. 
When learning takes place the degree is consistently lower than in the absence of it. The 
number of innovative partnerships experienced by a firm over time is between 3 and 30 
when there is learning, while it is much larger in the absence of it, with figures ranging 
between 20 and 80 (for a total population of size 100). 
The second structural measure we are interested in is cliquishness, i.e. the share of 
transitive triples. Rather than depicting the number itself, we represent the deviation 
from the equivalent random network that would obtain preserving the average degree. 
Thus figures larger than 1 suggest more structure than a random graph. For either 
small(below the threshold) or large values of θ the behaviour is similar in almost all 
parameter constellations. In the vicinity of the threshold however the behaviour of the 
system strongly depends on the presence of learning. Much larger amounts of 
cliquishness are obtained when learning takes place, a fact which is consistent with the 
fall in degree, as both indicate that learning compensates for the loss in diversity 
stemming from repeated interaction. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have addressed the issue of knowledge growth through the 
recombination of existing individual knowledge endowments in a cooperative process. 
The main issue concerns the tension between on one hand the reduction of uncertainty 
as a result former successful interactions and, on the other hand, the loss of mutual 
attractivity when successful innovations bring partners’ knowledge profiles closer 
together. One of the interesting consequence is that the network evolves towards a more 
structured state, individual agents concentrating their collaborations on a smaller 
number of strongly interconnected partners. This appears most strongly just above the 
threshold of innovation “separability”, where agents desert self-matching and begin   13 
cooperation. This narrow zone seems to present some features of a cooperation 
“optimum”, wherein the innovation process is separable enough to allow partners to 
retain some differentiation in their knowledge profiles, but still joint enough to permit 
mutual learning and transfer. This dilemma between cooperation efficiency and 
diversity can be partially avoided when the network is not a set of disconnected cliques 
but rather, while retaining strong cliquishness, also retains external links between 
groups, serving as a source of “external” diversity in knowledge (Cowan and Jonard, 
2004). This leads to questions of collective governance of the cooperative process. 
“Concerning network structure as an instrument, in the design of density and strength of 
ties, there is a complicated trade-off between competence and governance. A dense 
network, with many participants and many strong ties between them, supports 
governance, on the basis of reputation, coalitions to constraint behaviour, monitoring 
and trust based on identification. However it increases risks of spillover, reduces 
cognitive distance, and may lead to lock-in, which inhibit access to the variety of 
cognition needed for learning and innovation” (Nooteboom, 2004). 
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